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Rajan  has  earned  a  well-deserved  reputation  for  having  been  one  of  the  few  to  have 
hypothesized  in  a  famous  paper  presented  at  the  2005  Jackson  Hole  conference  that  a 
disastrous financial crisis could have occurred. The key thesis put forward by Rajan was that 
the radical changes that had taken place over the previous decades rendered the economic 
system more fragile in that they induced the financial system to create a high amount of risk.  
The aim of this paper is to show: i) that Rajan’s thesis is not coherent with the mainstream 
theory  according to which finance does not create risk; ii) that a meaningful theory capable of 
explaining the meaning of the elements used by Rajan to assert  that finance creates risk can 





At the 2005 Jackson Hole Conference, the theme of which was the legacy of the Greenspan 
era, R. Rajan  presented a paper in which he described the radical changes that had taken  
place in the financial system over the previous decades. The key thesis put forward by 
Rajan (2006) was that these changes contributed to increase the GDP growth rate, but at 
the same time, they rendered the economic system more fragile in that they had induced 
the financial system to create a high amount of risk. 
Rajan’s thesis garnered a lot of attention because it did not seem coherent with the 
celebratory tone of the conference towards Alan Greenspan, who was in the last year of his 
mandate. I believe there is another element that renders Rajan’s thesis particular: the fact 
that it was not coherent with the mainstream theory of finance. Indeed, according  to this 
theory, the financial system does not create risk; the risk is  given and the task of the 
financial system is to allocate it, that is, to redistribute the risk in such a way that it is borne 
by agents who have a higher propensity to take it.  
In his paper, Rajan did not tackle  the issue of whether his thesis was coherent  with 
the  mainstream  theory;  we  can  find  some  important  considerations  on  this  point  in  a 
subsequent work in which Rajan (2010)  proposes to explain the causes of the crisis. He 
maintains  that  there  are  different  causes,  and  therefore  different  responsibilities,  some 
more evident than others. Rajan attributes some responsibility also to economists who in 
the  last  few  decades  used  macroeconomic  models  that  did  not  consider  explicitly  the   2 
financial system,  and he invites them to elaborate macroeconomic models that incorporate 
the financial system.      
The first objective of this paper is to show that in order to follow this suggestion it is  
necessary to abandon the finance neutrality principle that distinguishes the mainstream 
theory according to which the financial system has no influence on  income, employment, 
growth, and also on the dimension of risk that characterises an economic system. This is 
the  principle  that  allows  us  to  describe  a    market  economy  through    macroeconomic  
models that completely overlook the financial system. It will be postulated, in particular, 
that the elements on which Rajan’s thesis is based, according to which in the last few 
decades the financial system created a  high amount of risk, making the system  more 
fragile, are not coherent with the mainstream theory of finance. The second objective is to 
show  that  a  meaningful  theory  capable  of  explaining  the  reasons  why  finance  is  not 
neutral, and to define the meaning of the elements used by Rajan to assert that risk is not 
independent of finance, can be elaborated on  the basis of the theories of Keynes and 
Schumpeter.      
The paper is divided into three parts. In the first part the analysis of the link between 
finance and risk described by Rajan is presented. In the second part it will be shown that 
the elements  used by Rajan to explain how finance can create risk are not coherent with 
the mainstream theory of finance. Finally, in the  third part, a theory of finance constructed 
using the theories of Keynes and Schumpeter, which allows us to explain the reasons why  
finance can create risk, is proposed.  
 
 
1. Why did finance make the world riskier? 
 
1.1 Rajan’s 2005 Jackson Hole paper. 
In the paper he presented at Jackson Hole, Rajan identifies three factors that had caused the 
transformation  of  the  financial  system  in  the  preceding  decades:  technological  change, 
deregulation and institutional change. He points out that these factors changed the nature of 
the typical transaction in the financial system: “A number of financial transactions have 
moved from being embedded in a long-term  relationship between a client and a financial 
institution to being conducted at arm’s lenght in a market.” (Rajan 2006, p. 504)
1 
                                                 
1 For a detailed analysis of the distinction between relationship-based systems and arm’s-length systems see: 
Rajan and Zingales 2003a, 2003b, 2003c.   3 
Rajan  notes  that  the  transformation  of  the  financial  system  had:  “..beneficial  real 
effects, increasing lending, entrepreneurship, and growth rates of GDP, while reducing 
costs of financial transactions…” (Rajan 2006, p. 504). But he also adds that economies’ 
greater  reliance  on  arm’s  length  transactions  had  created:  “new  vulnerabilities”  (Rajan 
2006, p. 512). To explain this assertion Rajan focuses on the changes that occurred in the 
banking system, in particular the spread of the “originate-to-securitize process” (Diamond 
and Rajan 2009, p. 606). He emphasises the link between the process of standardisation of 
financial instruments made possible by technological developments and deregulation, and 
the process of securitisation that allowed banks to sell part of their assets on the market.  
Rajan notes that securitisation created a specialisation within the financial system: on  the  
one hand, we have agents such as banks which, by granting credit to new clients originate 
the risk, and on the other agents, for example pension funds, that make their portfolio 
decisions  taking  a  long  term  view,  and  therefore  they  are  on  the  lookout  for  low-risk 
financial instruments.
2 Considering the effects of this process, Rajan explains that  this 
specialisation should have brought significant advantages since the banks, by tr ansferring 
the risk to other agents would have been able to lower the rates on loa ns and expand  
access to credit.
3 In  actual fact, while preparing his paper for the Jackson Hole conference, 
he realised, to his great surprise, that the securitisation process had made  banks riskier.
4    
The view that the process of securitisation should have made banks less risky was 
based on the hypothesis  that the risk was given.  On the contrary, Rajan realised that this 
                                                 
2 “The standardisation of contractual terms allows a loan to be packaged with other contracts and sold as a 
diversified bundle to passive investors who do not have origination capability. Alternatively, the cash flows 
from the bundle can be carved up  or ‘tranched’ into different securities, differing in liquidity, maturity, 
contingency, and risk, each of which appeals to a particular clientele. This process of ‘securitisation’ allows 
for    specialization  in  financial  markets  –those  who  have  specific  capabilities  in  originating  financial 
transactions can be different from those who ultimately hold the risk. Securitization thus allows the use of 
both the skills and the risk bearing capacity of the economy to the fullest extent possible.” (Rajan 2006, p. 
505)  
3 “In theory, with the risk better spread across sturdier shoulders, investors would demand a lower return for 
holding the risk, allowing the bank to charge lower loan rates and expand borrower’s access to finance.” 
(Rajan 2010, p. 2)  
4 “In preparation for writing the paper, I had asked my staff to prepare graphs and tables. As we looked 
through them, I noted a few that seemed curious. They were plots of different measures of the riskiness of 
large U.S. banks, and they suggested that banks had become, if anything, more exposed to risk over the past 
decade. This was surprising, for if banks were getting risky loans off their balance sheets by selling them, 
they should have become safer.” (Rajan 2010, p. 2)   4 
hypothesis was unfounded
5;  the process of securitisation had induced the banks to create 
new risk which had not been completely transferred to other operators; in other words  it 
made them riskier: 
 
 “Banks make returns both by originating risks and by bearing them. As plain vanilla 
risks can be moved off bank balance sheets into the balance  sheets of investment managers, 
bank have an incentive to originate more of them. Thus they will tend to feed rater than 
restrain the appetite for risk. Banks cannot, however, sell all risks. They often have to bear the 
most complicated and volatile portion of the risks they originate, so even though some risk has 
been moved off bank balance sheets, balance sheets have been reloaded with fresh, more 
complicated, risks. In fact, the data suggest that despite a deepening of financial markets, 
banks may not be any safer than in the past. Moreover, the risk they now bear is a small 




Concluding his paper, Rajan wondered what the consequences of the presence of this  
iceberg of risk created by the banks might be on the stability of the financial system and he 
did not exclude the possibility that there could be a catastrophic meltdown: 
 
“…what can we say about how the stability of the system has evolved as the nature of the 
system has changed? While the system now exploits the risk bearing capacity of the economy 
better by allocating risks more widely, it also takes on more risks than before. … While it is 
hard to be categorical about anything as complex as the modern financial system, it is possible 
that these developments are creating more financial-sector induced procyclicality than in the 
past. They may also create a greater (albeit still small) probability of a catastrophic meltdown. 
… It is … true that the financial system has survived some large shocks in the past, under the 
able stewardship of Chairman Geenspan…Nevertheless, the experience thus far should not 




1.2 Housing bubble and tail risk. 
The  subprime  mortgage  crisis  that  erupted  in  the  summer  of  2007  and  its  dramatic 
consequences in terms of the drop in income and employment seem to confirm Rajan’s 
most pessimistic forecasts. To  demonstrate  this thesis it is necessary to specify whether 
there is a link between the risk created  by the financial system which Rajan talks about, 
                                                 
5 “I eventually realized that I was committing the economist’s  cardinal sin of assuming ceteris paribus, that 
is, assuming that everything else but the phenomenon being studied, in this case securitization, remained the 
same.  Typically, everything does not remain the same. Most important, deregulation and developments like 
securitization had increased competition, which increased the incentives for bankers (and financial managers 
more generally) to take on more complex forms of risk.”  (Rajan 2010, p. 2)  
   5 
and the subprime mortgage crisis. Rajan describes this link in some works published after 
the crisis broke (Diamond and Rajan, 2006; Rajan 2010).   
Diamand and Rajan  (2009) emphasise that the crisis originated in the United States, 
the country with the most developed financial system, that is the system in which the 
transformations described in  the paper presented at the Jackson Hole conference occurred 
with greater intensity. They maintain that the spread of the securitisation process caused 
the creation of an iceberg of risk by the banking system, to use Rajan’s expression, of bad 
quality.
6  This relation between securitisation and quality of risk was not expected; indeed, 
according to the theory, the spread of the process of securitisation should have improved 
the working of the financial system since it should have allowed the issue of high quality 
securities against a set of low quality cr edits, due to the advantages deriving from the 
aggregation of credits whose probability of failure are not perfectly correlated. In this way 
against the mortgages granted to agents with low incomes, and therefore singularly at high 
risk, low risk securities underwritten by international investors could have been issued. The 
deterioration in  the quality of risk must therefore be explained  by some elements that 
induced the banking system to  use the instrument of securitisation in a distorted  way.
7  
Rajan identifies this element in the structure of incentives that influenced the decisions 
of investment managers, and in particular those of  bank managers, in recent years. This 
structure has changed dramatically due to the modification of  the remuneration system for 
investment managers that in recent years has been increasingly linked to the ir results.
8 He  
points out that this system of remuneration induced the banks to create a great mass of risk 
through the increase in the supply of subprime mortgages and to bear a significant amount 
                                                 
6 “… why did the crisis first manifest itself in the United States? Probably because the US innovated by 
securitizing subprime loans, thus drawing more marginal-credit-quality buyer into the market.” (Diamond 
and Rajan 2009, p. 606) 
7 According to Diamond and Rajan (2009), the  subprime mortgage crisis can be considered as the  undesired 
consequence  of  the  process  of  securitisation:  “The  ‘originate-to-securitize”  process    had  unintended 
consequences.” (Diamond and Rajan 2009, p. 606) 
8 “In the 1950s and 1960s, banks dominated financial systems. Banks managers were paid a largely fixed 
salary… In the new, deregulated, competitive environment, investment managers cannot be provided the 
same staid incentives as bank managers of yore. Because they have to have the incentive to search for goods 
investments, their compensation has to be sensitive to investment returns, especially returns  relative to their 
competitors.” (Rajan 2006, p. 501)   6 
of this risk by keeping on their balance sheets a substantial quantity of mortgage backed 
securities (MBS). 
9  
Rajan illustrates this point by noting that the results obtained by bank managers, on 
which their remuneration depends, cannot  be evaluated by simply considering the yields  
achieved,  since it is always possible to obtain greater returns by taking on greater risks. 
The results therefore must be assessed by  considering the degree of risk and the  yields 
obtained by competitors. In order to  improve their relative returns (measured by the  alpha 
index) bank managers can be induced to make financial decisions to which a tail risk is 
associated, that is decisions that produce very high yields in stable situations but with a 
very low risk of catastrophic losses.
10   Rajan emphasises that the propensity of investment 
managers to seek tail risk
11 can explain two choices that played an essential role in causing 
                                                 
9 “…what enveloped all of us was not some sort of collective hysteria or mania. Somewhat frighteningly, 
each one of us did what was sensible given the incentives we faced. Despite mounting evidence that things 
were going wrong, all of us clung to the hope that things would work out fine, for our interest lay in that 
outcome. Collectively, however, our actions took the world’s economy to the brink of disaster…. There are 
deep fault line in the global economy, fault lines that have developed because in an integrated economy and 
in an integrated world, what is best for the individual actor or institution is not always best for the system.” 
(Rajan 2010, p. 4)  
 
10 Rajan illustrates this point with an example : “Suppose a financial manager decides to write earthquake 
insurance policies but does not tell her investors. As she writes policies and collects premiums, she will 
increase her firms’ earnings. Moreover, because earthquakes occur rarely, no claims will be made for a long 
while.  If  the  manager  does  not  set  aside  reserves  for  the  eventual  payouts  that  will  be  needed  (for 
earthquakes, though rare, eventually do occur), she will be feted as the new Warren Buffet: all the premium 
she collects will be seen as pure returns, given that there is no apparent risk. The money can all be paid out as 
bonus or dividends. Of course, one day the earthquake will occur, and she will have to pay insurance claims. 
Because she has set aside no reserves, she will likely default on the claims, and her strategy will be revealed 
for the sham it is. But before that, she will have enjoyed the adulation of the investing masses and may have 
salted away enough in bonuses to retire comfortably to a beach house in the Bahamas. With luck, if the 
earthquake occurs in the midst of a larger cataclysm, she can attribute her disastrous performance to a one-in-
ten-thousand-year event and back in another job soon. Failing in a herd rarely has adverse consequences.” 
(Rajan 2010, pp. 138-9) 
11 “More generally, at times when financing is plentiful, so that there is immense competition among bankers 
and fund managers, the need to create alpha pushes many of them inexorably toward taking on tail risk. For 
tail risk occurs so rarely that it can be well hidden for a long time: a manager may not even be aware he is 
taking it. But the return are high, because people are willing to pay a lot to avoid being hit by cataclysmic 
losses in bad times. So if the manager produces the returns but his investors do not (at least for a while) 
account for the additional risk the manager is taking with their money, the manager will look like a genius 
and be rewarded handsomely. He may well come to believe that he is one. In other words, it is the very   7 
the subprime mortgage crisis: i) the decision of banks to expand the supply of  mortgages 
to agents with low incomes; ii) the decision of banks to keep a large number of MBS 
created through the process of the  securitisation on their balance sheets. These decisions 
caused considerable losses for the banking system after the bursting of the housing bubble 
culminating with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Indeed this failure  paralysed the 
banking system and triggered a credit crunch that had serious consequences for  production 
and employment levels. 
The banks took these two decisions early in the new century, in a period in which 
housing prices were rising. As Shiller (2008) demonstrates, the prices of housing started to 
increase in the US from the second half of the 1990s, in concomitance with the growth  of 
the  dot.com  bubble.  This  phase  of  price  growth  did  not  stop  with  the bursting  of  the 
dot.com bubble in 2001; on the  contrary,  the fall in the stock of the technological firms 
and the policy of low interest rates adopted by the Fed, stimulated demand for housing and 
led to a continuous rise in prices. The bank managers’ decision to expand the supply of 
mortgages to agents with  low incomes contributed to expand the demand for housing and 
therefore to fuel the housing bubble.  
The continuous rise in the price of housing became a key factor in the profits made by 
the banks since it was the necessary condition to induce subjects with low incomes to 
underwrite mortgages  that provided for future payment commitments that could be met 
only in the case of a constant rise of the real estate prices.
12 Thus the tail risk associated 
with the decision of the banks to expand the suppl y of subprime mortgages corresponded 
to the probability that the housing bubble could burst, and therefore that the rise in housing 
prices could  be  stopped.
13 When the housing bubble burst, it became evident that the 
                                                                                                                                                          
willingness of the modern financial market to offer powerful rewards for the rare producer of alpha that also 
generates strong incentives to deceives investors” (Rajan 2010, p. 139) 
 
12 “A significant portion of the additional demand came from segments of the population with low credit 
ratings or impaired credit histories –the so-called subprime and Alt-A segments –who now obtained access to 
credit that had hitherto been denied the them. Moreover, rising house prices gave subprime borrowers the 
ability to keep refinancing into low interest rate mortgages (thus avoiding default) even as they withdrew the 
home equity they had build up to buy more cars and TV set. For many the need to repay loans seemed remote 
and distant.” (Rajan 2010, pp. 5-6)  
13 “… during an asset price boom, … investment managers are willing to bear the low probability ‘tail’ risk 
that asset prices will revert to fundamentals abruptly, and the knowledge that many of their peers are herding 
on this risk gives them comfort that they will not under perform significantly if boom turns to burst.” (Rajan 
2006, p. 501)    8 
banks held a large amount of MBS, and this surprised many observers who deemed that the 
banks, who were aware of the low quality of the mortgages issued, had abstained from 
underwriting these securities. 
Rajan notes that this behaviour by the banks is not a sign of madness, but it is coherent 
with the structure of incentives that led them to seek short term gains and to bear a large 
quantity of risk by means of the creation of subprime mortgages and the acquisition of 
MBS.
14  The strategy of the banks was influenced by what he considers the two mistakes 
made by the Federal  Reserve in the period preceding the crisis.  The first is the policy of 
low interest rates adopted by the Fed to support the employment level after the bursting of 
the dot.com bubble.  Rajan underlines that this policy contributed significantly to the 
formation of the housing bubble  as it induced the agents to expe ct that rates of interest 
would not be raised to halt the growth of hou sing prices.
15  These expectations  were 
confirmed by the second wrong decisions taken by the Fed, known as the  Greenspan put, 
which was the pledge not to intervene to avoid  the formation of the bubble since the 
monetary  authorities  are  not  able  to  identify  a  bubble  before  it  bursts,  and  instead  to 
intervene to reduce the consequences of the bursting of the bubble.
16 
                                                 
14 “Given that originators would have understood the deterioration of the underlying quality of mortgages, it 
is surprising that they held on so many of the mortgage-baked-securities (MBS) in their own portfolios. … 
The amounts of MBS held seemed too high to be purely inventory. Some holdings could have been portions 
of  the  package  they  could  not  sell,  but  then  this  would  not  explain  why  banks  held  on  to  AAA-rated 
securities, which seemed to be the most highly demanded of mortgage backed securities. The real answer 
seems to be that bankers thought these securities were worthwhile investments, despite their risk. Investment 
in MBS seemed to be part of a culture of excessive risk taking that had overtaken banks. … Of course, 
originators could not completely ignore the true quality of borrowers since they would be responsible for 
initial defaults, but because house prices were rising steadily over this period, even this source of discipline 
weakened: the house price rise would give the homeowner the ‘equity’ with which he could finance loan 
repayment.”” (Diamond and Rajan 2009, p. 607). See also:  Rajan 2010.  
15 “… bubbles develop based on a kind of ‘greater fool’ theory –that even if an asset is already trading at an 
inflated price, someone will be willing to buy it at an even more inflated price. By signaling that it will 
tighten liquidity conditions, and thus constrain financing and trading, the central bank can signal to investors 
that there will be fewer fools out there with the capacity to buy, making it more difficult for the bubble to 
grow.” (Rajan 2010, p. 112) 
16 “… the Fed encouraged [bubbles] through an implicit commitment, which might have done far more 
damage than any other Fed action. This commitment, the so-called ‘Greenspan put’, essentially said that the 
Fed could not really tell when asset prices were building up into a bubble, and so instead the Fed would 
ignore asset prices but stand ready to pick up the pieces  when the  bubble burst. … The logic  was … 
positively dangerous. It fueled the flames of asset-price inflation by telling Wall Street and banks across the   9 
The Fed’s decisions contributed to encouraging the banks to bet on the continuous rise 
in housing prices even though bank managers were aware of the fact that the real estate   
prices  were clearly  overvalued.  Theoretically, an agent who deems  that  the price of  a 
certain asset is strongly overvalued could obtain a profit by betting on the fall in the prices 
of that asset. In reality, this strategy became very difficult to implement in a period in  
which the remuneration of  investment managers was linked to short term results; to bet 
against the market in these conditions implied forgoing the profits that the competitors 
obtained in the short term on account of the continuous increase in  housing prices. This 
exclusive focus on short term results and the particular attention to the results obtained by 
competitors  induced  investment  managers  to  take  the  same  decisions,  relying  on  the 
continuous rise in housing prices, and led the top managers to  support, within the financial 
institutions,  the  decisions  of  traders  with  a  greater  propensity  for  risk.
17  There is  an 
additional reason that encouraged bank managers to herd with other investment managers 
and it is the fact that in this way none of them would obtain  worse results than the others  
even in the case  of  the catastrophic event  associated with  tail risk. In this   case, no  
individual banker could have been accused of having obtained worse results than the others 
since the catastrophic event  whose probability of occurring was one in a million, would 
have affected the entire financial system.
18 
In conclusion, according to Rajan, the crisis was a consequence of the combination of 
a distorted system of inc entives and the erroneous  decisions of the Fed which led the 
financial system to create and hold an excessive quantity of risk: 
                                                                                                                                                          
country that the Fed would not rise interest rates to curb asset prices, and that if matters went terribly wrong, 
it  would  step  in  to  prop  prices  up.  The  commitment  to  put  a  floor  under  asset  prices  was  dubbed  the 
‘Greenspan put’. It told traders and bankers that if they gambled, the Fed would not limit their gains, but if 
their bets turned sour, the Fed would limit the consequences. … the willingness to flood the market with 
liquidity in the event of a severe downturn sent a clear message to bankers: ‘Don’t bother storing cash or 
marketable assets for a rainy day; we will be there to help you.’” (Rajan 2010, pp. 112-3) 
17 “When a CEO adjudicated a dispute between his star trader, who had produced $ 50 million in profits 
every quarter for the past ten quarters, and his risk manager, who had opposed the trader’s risk taking all 
along, the natural impulse would be to side with the trader. The risk manager was often portrayed as the old 
has-been who do not understand the new paradigm –and the risk takers had the track record to prove it.” 
(Rajan 2010, p. 141) 
18 “Unlike ordinary loans or individuals mortgages, where defaults occur in isolation, highly rated, diversified 
mortgage-backed securities were likely to risk default only if mortgages across the country defaulted… the 
systematic nature of tail risks ensured that banks would be collectively in trouble if a crisis occurred, and that 
government support would be fortcoming. This mitigates the costs of those risks.” (Rajan 2010, pp. 148-9)  
   10 
 
“…  I  want  to  emphasize  that  the  combination  of  incentives  for  high-powered 
performance that are inherent in modern financial system and the unwillingness of a civilized 
government to let failure in the financial sector drag down ordinary citizens generates the 




2. Tail risk, housing bubble and the mainstream theory of finance. 
 
The  explanation  of  the  origin  of  the  crisis  elaborated  by  Rajan,  and  shared  by  many 
economists, is not coherent with the mainstream theory of finance since it is based on two 
points that are at odds with this theory: i) the first point is the assertion that the financial 
system has created an excessive quantity of risk; ii) the second regards the nature of the tail 
risk that bank managers took on to improve their results, driven by a distorted system of 
incentives.  
The thesis that the financial system creates risk is extraneous to the mainstream theory  
which holds that the degree of risk is independent of the financial system whose role is to 
allocate, that is, to redistribute resources and therefore risks from savers to those who are 
able  to  manage    the  resources  bearing  the  risks.
19  The mainstream theory defines the 
phenomenon of finance starting from saving decisions and investment decisions and  it 
underlines that finance becomes relevant in a world in which  the agents that save do not 
coincide with the agents who invest, that is in a world characterised by the  dissociation 
between  investment decisions and saving decisions.  The  key  function of the financial 
system is to make possible the transfer of the  resources saved   by savers to agents who 
invest which we can identify with the firms. The saved resources are transferred by the 
savers to firms by means of a credit contract; the mainstream theory defines a causal 
sequence according to which saving decisions determine the supply of credit and therefore 
investment decisions. The rate of interest is the variable that puts in equilibrium demand 
for and supply of credit and therefore saving decisions and investment decisions.  
According  to  the  mainstream  theory,  the  presence  of  financial  intermediaries  is 
justified by the existence of obstacles that make the  direct exchange of the saved resources 
between  the  savers  and  entrepreneurs  difficult.  The  principal  obstacle  on  which 
                                                 
19 This definition appears also in Rajan’s book: “The role of financial markets is to allocate resources to those 
most capable of using them, while spreading the risks to those most capable of bearing them,” (Rajan 2010, 
p. 228)   11 
economists’  attention  has  focused  since  the  1970s  is  the  presence  of  asymmetric 
information. According to the mainstream theory the credit market can be compared to the 
used  car  market  described  by  Akerlof  (1970),  who  emphasised  that  the  presence  of 
asymmetric information stimulates the creation of agents whose purpose is to reduce the 
information costs; he considered, in particular, the activity of merchants that specialize in 
evaluating the quality of the goods exchanged. The banks play the same role in the capital 
market as the merchants play in Akerlof's used car market; as asserted by  Blinder and 
Stiglitz (1983, p.299):  “Imperfect information about the probability of default has several 
fundamental implications for the nature of capital markets… it gives rise to institutions – 
like banks – that specialize in acquiring information about default risk.”. These arguments 
allow  us  to  conclude  that  according  to  the  mainstream  theory  the  dimension  of  risk 
depends only on the flow of saved resources and it is not affected by the decisions of 
financial intermediaries. Indeed, banks’ function is only to allocate the saved resources to 
those most capable of using them.  
There  is  a  second  element  of  Rajan’s  explanation  that  is  not  coherent  with  the 
mainstream theory: the nature of the tail risk taken on by bank managers. As we have seen, 
the tail risk borne by the banking system corresponds to the risk that the rise in house 
prices stops, triggering the insolvency of the mortgage holders and the drop in the prices of 
the MBS.  
This concept   applies in a world in which the phenomenon of speculation is prominent  
and  this  presupposes  the  existence  of  markets  in  which  financial  assets  are  constantly 
traded, while the mainstream theory applies to a world in which these markets are not 
present  and  the  phenomenon  of  speculation    does    not  exist.  To  illustrate  this  point, 
following the approach of Vernon Smith (1988, 2009),  we can distinguish two types of 
market: the first are markets in which producers and purchasers trade goods that disappear 
from the market once they have been purchased; the second are markets in which goods 
that can be sold again at any subsequent  time are traded. A speculative bubble can occur 
only in an economic system in which the second type of market exists where a good can be 
bought not in relation to the utility its use produces but depending on the price at which it 
can be sold in the future.  
The mainstream finance theory applies to an economic system comprising only the 
first type of markets, indeed, the presence of the second type of markets characterises an 
economic system in which the concept of wealth is important, a concept which is difficult 
to associate with the world  described by the mainstream  theory. In fact, this theory, as we   12 
have recalled, defines the phenomenon of credit starting with the concepts of saving and 
investment:  saving  decisions  determine  the  credit  supply  and  therefore  the  flow  of 
investments; banks are simply intermediaries who eliminate the effects of the presence of 
obstacles  that  impede  the  direct  transfer  from  savers  to  firms.  These  relations  can  be 
applied to an economic system in which few goods are produced and in which money is a 
mere means of exchange. The  traditional economic theory describes the functioning of this 
economic system using models in which it is assumed that a single good is produced; this  
hypothesis is a common thread in the work of classic economists, neoclassicals right up to 
contemporary supporters of the mainstream theory. Smith (1776), for instance, describes 
the effects of saving decisions on the development of the economic system by considering 
a  world  in  which  only  corn  is  produced;  Böhm  Bawerk  (1884)  instead  considers  a 
fishermen’s  economy  in  which  only  fish  are  produced.  In  these  economies  the  saving 
corresponds to the amount of corn or fish produced which is not consumed and which can 
therefore be used to produce capital goods that will allow the system  to produce more corn 
or fish; the saving is represented, for example, by the quantity of corn or fish that is needed 
to pay the workers involved in producing ploughs or boats.  
It is difficult to associate wealth with this type of economic system; it is unrealistic to 
assume that, for example, a carpenter is willing to accumulate a big quantity of tables that 
permit him to purchase at any future time, an unlimited quantity of food or clothing. We 
can reasonably assume that in this economy there is a limit to the amount of goods that an 
individual  wishes  to  accumulate  and,  therefore,  that  the  concept  of  wealth  is  hardly 
relevant.  
If we exclude the concept of wealth it becomes unrealistic to assume the existence of 
markets in which financial assets are traded on the basis of the expectations about the price 
that they will fetch in the future, and therefore to hypothesise the presence of speculative 
bubbles and of financial crises caused by the underestimation of the risk of insolvency of 
those who gamble on the continuous rise in the price of assets. In the economy described 
by the mainstream theory the only risk is that associated with the presence of asymmetric 
information; this risk can be described by means of the example proposed by Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1990) to illustrate the role of banks by considering an agricultural economy, in 
which the object of the exchange is seed to be planted in plots of land having different 
productivity:  
 
“The  need  for  credit  arises  from  the  discrepancy  between  individual’s  resource 
endowments and investment opportunities. This can be seen most simply if we imagine a 
primitive agricultural economy, where different individuals own different plots of land and   13 
have different endowments of seed with which to plant the land. … The marginal return to 
additional  seed  on  different  plots  of  land  may  differ  markedly.  National  output  can  be 
increased enormously if the seed can be reallocated from plots of lands where it has a low 
marginal product to plots where it has a high marginal product. But this requires credit, that is, 
some farmers will have to get more seed than their endowment in return for a promise to repay 
next period, when the crop is harvested. Banks are the  institutions within this society for 
screening the loan applicants, for determining which plots have really high marginal returns, 
and for monitoring, for ensuring that the seed are actually planted, rather than, say, consumed 
by the borrower in a consumption binge ” (Stiglitz and Weiss 1990, pp. 91-92) 
 
It is difficult to hypothesise that in this economic system a crisis could occur due to the 
propensity of banks to take on a tail risk; if we consider the example proposed by Stiglitz 
and Weiss we can observe that the risk  that banks must face is the  one related to the 
evaluation of the quality of the plots of land and the characteristics of the farmer who 
wishes to use the saved corn. Of course, it  is possible to imagine that there could be a 
banker who is incapable of assessing the quality of the plots of land or to distinguish  a 
good  farmer  from  a swindler, but that is not sufficient to trigger a crisis. A crisis could 
manifest itself only if we  assume that a large part of the bankers-merchants have become  
suddenly  incapable of assessing the quality of the terrain or to distinguish a good farmer 
from a swindler. 
We can conclude that Rajan’s explanation should lead economists to elaborate a new 
theory of finance which, unlike the mainstream one, is capable of explaining how finance 
can create risks and the phenomenon of asset price bubbles. Rajan acknowledges that this 
crisis  has  highlighted:  “…the  failings  of  academic  economists  in  the  macroeconomic 
sphere.  ”  (Rajan  2010,  p.116)  as  witnessed  by  the  fact  that  in  the  last  few  decades 
economists have used macroeconomic models that  completely overlooked finance: 
 
“Many  past  macroeconomic  models  had  a  single  representative  agent  making  all 
decisions.  The  representative-agent  models  were  easy  to  work  with  and  did  offer  useful 
prediction  about  policy,  but  they  took  for  granted  the  plumbing  underlying  the  industrial 
economy –the financial claims, the transactions, the incentive structures, the firms, the banks, 
the markets, the regulations, and so on.  … In coming years, macroeconomic modeling must 
incorporate more of plumbing, which has been studied elsewhere in economics.” (Rajan 2010, 
pp. 116-7) 
 
The problem of macroeconomics is not simply that of creating models that specify  the 
financial sector, but in the first place it is that of elaborating a theory that explains the role 
of finance and therefore permits the definition of the relation between finance and the other 
components  of  the  economic  system.  The  mainstream  theory  does  not  allow  the 
elaboration of models that assign a significant role to finance. The  macroeconomic models  
based on the concept of representative agent overlook the financial system not for reasons   14 
of simplicity, but because they are based on the mainstream theory of finance that  affirms 
the principle of the neutrality of finance.  According to this principle,  financial relations 
are simply the reflection of saving decisions and investment decisions and therefore, once 
the variables that influence these decisions have been defined it  is not necessary to specify 
the  financial  relations.
20  According to the mainstream theory , therefore,  the financial 
system does not have a distinct role with respect to the real economy.   
In conclusion, the explanation of the origin of the crisis elaborated by Rajan  should 
lead economists to elaborate an  alternative finance theory to the mainstream one; a theory 
that is: i) able to explain how finance can create risk; ii) able to explain the phenomenon of 
speculation. In the last part of this paper it will be shown that it is possible to build a 
theoretical model that possesses these characteristics using what we learned from Keynes 
and Schumpeter.       
 
 
3. An alternative theory of finance   
 
Many  economists  have  highlighted  the  need  to  recuperate  Keynes’s  teachings  and  to 
revaluate the work of Minsky.
21 In this paper we set out a theory of finance which takes as 
a starting point  Keynes’s  1933 works   in  which he highlights  the need to  elaborate  a 
monetary theory of production in order to explain the phenomena of the crisis and the 
                                                 
20 This point  has been  well explained by, for example, McCallum (1989) who introduces his Monetary 
Economics text by making explicit the reasons why he looks at the money market, completely leaving aside 
the credit market; he observes that this decision: “… rests basically on the fact that in making their borrowing 
and lending decisions, rational households (and firms) are fundamentally concerned with goods and services 
consumed or provided at various points in time. They are basically concerned, that is, with choices involving 
consumption  and  labour  supply  in  the  present  and  in  the  future.  But  such  choices  must  satisfy  budget 
constraints and thus are precisely equivalent to decisions about borrowing and lending - that is, supply and 
demand choices for financial assets. … Consequently, there is no need to consider both types of decisions 
explicitly.  … it is seriously misleading to discuss issues in terms of possible connections between ‘the 
financial and real sectors of the economy’, to use a phrase that appears occasionally in the literature on 
monetary policy. The phrase is misleading because it fails to recognise that the financial sector  is a real 
sector.” McCallum (1989, pp. 29-30) 
21 See for example: Akerlof and Shiller 2009, Krugman  2009, 2011,  Skidelsky 2009, 201 1, Sachs 2009, 
Colander 2009, 2010,  Crotty 2009, 2011 , Kregel 2009, Lawson 2009, Leijhonufvud 2009, Wray 2009, 
Arestis and Singh 2010, Stiglitz 2010, Laidler 2010 , Roubini and Mihm 2010, Goodhart 2010,   Lucarelli 
2011.    15 
fluctuations in income and employment.  He also notes that the inability of the classical 
theory to explain these phenomena is due to the fact that this theory considers money as a 
neutral variable.
22 Keynes’s key message is to stress that the presence of money constitutes 
the  necessary  condition  to  explain  the  crises  and  thus  the  two  elements  on  which  the 
explanation of the origin of the crisis elaborated by Rajan is based. Following Keynes it is 
possible: i) to specify the relation between money and the concept of uncertainty, which  
allows us to  elaborate a meaningful explanation of the reasons why: ‘finance creates risk’; 
ii) specify the relation between money and speculation. The next section describes the 
relation between money and uncertainty, while in the following one the relation between 
money and speculation will be presented. The last section contains an explanation of the 
crisis elaborated on the basis of the new theory of finance.  
 
 
3.1 Money and uncertainty 
The causal relation between money and uncertainty can be defined by considering a world 
in which a particular money, such as bank money, is used. This is a point common to 
Keynes and  Schumpeter; they both distinguish between two types of economies. The first 
one is an economic system, which Keynes defined as  a  real exchange economy while 
Schumpeter as a pure exchange economy, in which money is neutral. The second one, 
which Keynes defines as a monetary economy and Schumpeter as a capitalist economy, is 
an economic system in which the presence of bank money radically changes the structure 
of the economic system compared with a real exchange economy. It is not simply the 
presence of money that characterises a monetary economy but the presence of money that 
has particular characteristics that Keynes and Schumpeter identify in bank money. They 
both underline that the spread of  bank money  has a big impact on the structure of the 
economic system.  The causal sequence that links bank money and uncertainty and thus 
permits us to consider the financial system as a creator of uncertainty, in line with Rajan’s  
affirmation, can be defined by considering two relations: the former is the relation between 
investment  decisions    and  uncertainty;  the  latter  is  the  relation  between  money  and 
investment decisions. These relations  are dealt with in the next two sections.   
 
 
                                                 
22 “…the conditions required for the ‘neutrality’ of money… are, I suspect, precisely the same as those which 
will insure that crises do not occur.”(Keynes 1933, 410-11)   16 
3.1.1 Investments, innovation  and uncertainty 
The    relation  between  investment  decisions  and  uncertainty  can  be  explained  by 
recalling what Keynes (1937a) argues on  the classical theory; in his view this theory  is 
able  to  describe  only  a  world  without  uncertainty,  that  is  an  economy  in  which 
consumption decisions prevail and decisions on investment and wealth accumulation are 
absent.
23 Naturally it would be excessive to claim that the classical theory describes an 
economic system based only on consumption decisions; instead, what divides the classical 
theory from the keynesian theory is the specification o f the characteristics of investment 
decisions.  The classical theory considers investments as a phenomenon that depends on 
saving decisions and is independent of the presence of bank money.  This conception  can 
be applied to a corn economy in which corn is at the same time, according to Smith (1776), 
a consumer good if it is used to maintain an unproductive worker, that is a worker involved 
in the production of services in favour of the upper classes, or a capital good if instead it is 
used as wages to pay the productive worker, i.e. a worker involved in producing corn.  
 What distinguishes the investments that characterise the monetary economy described 
by Keynes is the fact that they are closely associated with the dimension of uncertainty. Of 
course even in the case of an economy that produces just one good, we can assume that an 
entrepreneur is not able to predict in probabilistic terms the future results of his decisions. 
This  situation  arises  due  to  extra-economic  factors  such  as  unfavourable  climatic 
conditions that ruin the harvest, or social-political events such as the break-out of a war, 
and so forth. What distinguishes the investments that are made in a monetary economy is 
the fact that the impossibility of predicting their results in probabilistic terms is due to 
factors of an economic nature, that is the factors which make the distinction between the 
production phase and the sale phase relevant. This conclusion can be understood if we 
consider the examples of investment decisions used by Keynes: 
 
                                                 
23  “The  whole  object  of  the  accumulation  of  wealth  is  to  produce  results,  or  potential  results,  at  a 
comparatively distant, and sometimes at an indefinitely distant, date. Thus the  fact that our knowledge of the 
future is fluctuating, vague and uncertain, renders wealth a peculiarly unsuitable subject for the methods of 
the classical economic theory. This theory might work very well in a world in which economic goods were 
necessarily consumed within a short interval of their being produced. But it requires, I suggest, considerable 
amendment if it is to be applied to a world in which the accumulation of wealth for an indefinitely postponed 
future is an important factor; and the greater the proportionate part played by such wealth accumulation the 
more essential does such amendment become.” Keynes (1937a, p. 113). 
   17 
“Our knowledge of the factors which will govern the yield of an investment some year 
hence is usually very slight and often negligible. If we speak frankly, we have to admit that 
our basis of knowledge for estimating the yield ten years hence of a railway, a copper mine, a 
textile factory, the goodwill of a patent medicine, an Atlantic liner, a building in the City of 
London, amounts to little and sometimes to nothing; or even five years hence.” (Keynes 1936, 
149-50) 
 
The  future  yield  of  a  railway,  a  copper  mine  or  an  Atlantic  liner  are  not  easily 
foreseeable  because they do not coincide with the productivity of some specific productive 
factor such as land in the case of the Smith’s corn economy, or the boat in the case of 
Böhm-Bawerk’s  fishermen’s economy. The investments considered by Keynes have the 
same characteristics as the innovations that are  at the centre of Schumpeter’s analysis. As 
is well known, Schumpeter (1912) holds that innovations constitute the first endogenous 
factor that brings about the process of change characterising a capitalist economy. The 
phenomenon of innovation regards the sphere of production and it may consist  of the 
realization of a new product, the introduction of a new productive method or the opening 
of new markets.  
We can consider the investments of the keynesian entrepreneur as the tool that  firms 
use  in  order  to  launch new  products  on  the  market,  or  modify  the  productive  process 
through which the existing goods are realized, or even open new markets; so the keynesian 
entrepreneur  who  takes  the  investment  decisions  coincides  with  the  schumpeterian 
entrepreneur  who  introduces  innovations.  This  economy  cannot  be  described  using  a 
theoretical model that assumes that a single good is produced since the entrepreneurs, with 
their  investment  decisions,  introduce  innovations  which  create  new  goods.  This 
characteristic gives prominence to the uncertainty dimension. In an economy in which just 
one  good  is  produced,  such  as  a  corn  economy  whose  investments  are  made  up  of 
unconsumed corn, entrepreneurs are sure of selling everything they produce because the 
good produced is what ensures the survival of consumers. This does not hold when we 
consider innovations that give rise to the production of new goods: the entrepreneur who 
produces the new good is not at all sure that he will be able to sell, making a satisfactory 
profit, all of the production because the innovation alters the existing world, making it very 
difficult to predict the reaction of the consumers to the new proposal (Schumpeter 1912, 
65).  For  this  reason,  both  Keynes  and  Schumpeter  note  that  investment  decisions  and  
innovations are carried out by agents who have particular skills, that is by agents who are 
able to take decisions in conditions of uncertainty, guided by what Keynes defined as 
animal spirits: 
   18 
“… a large proportion  of our positive activities depend on spontaneous optimism rather 
than on a mathematical expectation, whether moral or hedonistic or economic. Most, probably, 
of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which will be drawn out 
over many days to come, can only be taken as a result of animal spirits – of a spontaneous 
urge  to  action  rather  than  inaction,  and  not  as  the  outcome  of  a  weighted  average  of 
quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities. Enterprise only pretends to itself 
to be mainly actuated by the statements in its own prospectus, however candid and sincere. 
Only a little more than an expedition to the South Pole, is it based on an exact calculation of 
benefits to come. Thus if the animals spirits are dimmed and the spontaneous optimism falters, 
leaving us to depend on nothing but a mathematical expectation, enterprise will fade and 
die…” (Keynes 1936, 161-2)
24    
 
In  a  world  in  which  several  goods  are  produced,  the  investments  that  lead  to  the 
production of new ones are made in conditions of uncertainty as the innovator-entrepreneur 
is not able to know, for example, how many cars he will be able to sell and at what price.   
 
 
3.1.2 Bank money and investment decisions 
The second link of the causal sequence between money and uncertainty is constituted by 
the relation between bank money and investments. To explain this relation  we can observe 
that both the keynesian entrepreneur and the schumpeterian innovator-entrepreneur must 
have the resources available to them to carry out their investments; bank money is the tool 
that  enables  them  to  obtain  these  resources.  The  importance  of  bank  money  can  be 
explained by recalling that the investments that characterise a monetary economy are very 
different  from  those  that  are  found,  for  example,  in  Smith’s  corn  economy.  In  a  corn 
economy to invest means to decide not to consume a part of the corn crop in order to 
produce more corn, while in a monetary economy to invest means, for example, to decide 
to build a railway; building a railway would be very difficult without bank money.   
Indeed,  let  us  suppose  that  in  our  corn  economy  an  entrepreneur  emerges  who, 
following his animal spirits, plans to build a railway the construction of which requires the 
employment of a certain number of workers for ten years. Let us further assume that the 
existing production techniques make it possible to produce a quantity of corn sufficient to 
guarantee  the  survival  of  the  farm  workers  and  those  that  might  be  employed  in  the 
construction of the railway. We can observe that the railway, at least theoretically, could be 
built also in a corn economy; in this case the construction of the railway is financed by the 
corn  producers  who  give  to  our  entrepreneur  the  corn  necessary  to  pay  the  workers 
                                                 
24 Some years earlier Schumpeter (1912) noted that the introduction of innovations required very different   
capabilities  from  those  needed  to  run  existing  firms  and  he  describes  the  decisions  of  the  innovating 
entrepreneur using similar terms to those used by Keynes  (see: Bertocco 2007).   19 
involved in building the railway. In return, they receive debt claims that will give them, 
when the railway is built, the right to obtain a quantity of corn equal to the amount lent 
during construction plus a premium consisting of the interest. 
There is at least one fundamental element that impedes the realisation of this credit 
contract. It is the fact that it is very difficult for corn producers to assess whether the 
entrepreneur who plans to construct the railway will be able to return the loaned capital. 
Indeed  the credit contract necessary to finance the construction of the railway is very 
different from the one, that is usually made in a corn economy, under which the corn 
producer gives the excess corn over the amount he intends to consume to another producer 
who will use it to produce corn. In this case, given the production technique, it is easy for 
the creditor to calculate the yield of the loaned corn and thus to define the rate of interest to 
apply  to  the  debtor;  in  the  case  of  the  railway  this  evaluation  is  much  more  difficult 
because there is no physical law that makes it possible to calculate how much corn will be 
obtained by the sale of train tickets starting from the amount of corn used to build the 
railway.  
The construction of the railway becomes easier in a world in which bank money is 
used.  In this case our entrepreneur will have to convince the banks, not the corn producers, 
of the profitability of his project. The banks will finance the construction of the railway by 
creating new money with which our entrepreneur will pay the workers who will then be 
able to buy corn. The corn producers will not have any difficulty in exchanging corn  for 
bank money, which is a perfectly liquid debt claim that can be used as a means of payment 
at any time. Although they do sell corn to the workers involved in building the railway, the 
corn producers are not creditors of our entrepreneur who is instead in debt to the bank, 
which is in turn in debt to those who own bank money. These agents may be the corn 
producers if we assume that the latter decide to accumulate the money obtained by selling 
the corn, or other agents that decided to accumulate the money obtained from payment of 
goods or services.   
Banks  therefore  carry  out  a  key  role  in  a  monetary  economy:  they  evaluate  the 
applications  for  financing  presented  by  entrepreneurs.  The  banks  share  with  the 
entrepreneurs the responsibility of deciding which investments are carried out; with their 
decisions they influence the development of the economic system; it is a very different role 
from that of mere intermediary that they could perform in a corn economy by facilitating 
the transfer of corn saved to the producers who intend to expand their grain production. 
Thus, we can maintain that the presence of  bank money, and a well-developed credit   20 
market, constitutes the necessary condition for the development of an economy in which 
investment decisions become  relevant and in which the presence of uncertainty becomes 
an essential factor. It is an economic system in which banks create uncertainty through the 
production of money and credit, since, by financing the construction of  railways, they 
induce the economic system to take on a risk, which cannot be calculated in probabilistic 
terms, about the success of the railway; we can state that  uncertainty is not merely an 
exogenous dimension, but it becomes a factor whose  presence is explained by the spread 
of bank money. 
 
 
3.2 Bank money and speculation 
The phenomenon of speculation  is the second element that must be explained by a theory 
of finance coherent with Rajan’s analysis of the origin of the subprime mortgage crisis. To 
explain the phenomenon of speculation it  is necessary to justify the presence of what V. 
Smith (1988, 2009) defines as asset markets, that is markets dealing in  assets that after 
purchase do not  disappear from the market but can be continuously  traded in the future.  
To explain the presence of these markets it is necessary, as we have already noted, to 
define the concept of wealth. It can be shown that the presence of a bank money and the 
elements that characterise the relation between bank money and uncertainty that we have 
illustrated in the previous section, allow us to define the concept of wealth and thus of 
speculation.  
We have already noted that it is unrealistic  to associate  the concept of wealth with an 
economic system that can be compared to Smith’s corn economy in which a single good is 
produced. This does not apply in the case of the monetary economy described by Keynes 
where the existence of bank money radically changes the concepts of  credit  and saving. In 
a corn economy decisions of the producer-saver are at the origin of the causal sequence 
that determines the supply of credit and therefore  investment decisions, but in a world in 
which bank money is used this causal sequence is no longer valid. In this case the farmer, 
for example, produces corn to meet the demand of the workers involved in the construction 
of the railway who purchase the corn in exchange for the  money created by the banks to 
finance the innovator-entrepreneur who decided to build the  railway.  
The farmer does not become a saver at the moment when he decides to produce grain 
and to consume just a part of it, but at the moment in which he sells the corn for money 
and decides to accumulate money. The corn producer becomes a saver not because he is   21 
the creditor of a specific agent to whom he lent corn, but because he decides to accumulate 
purchasing power, obtained by selling corn, that can be used at any future moment to 
purchase goods.  Money transforms savers into wealth owners; this point is highlighted by 
Keynes when he states that: “… the act of saving implies… a desire for ‘wealth’ as such, 
that  is  for  a  potentiality  of  consuming  an  unspecified  article  at  an  unspecified  time.” 
(Keynes 1936, p. 211). 
Of  course  the  presence  of  savers-wealth  owners  cannot  be  explained  within  an 
economic system in which a  single good is produced, rather it characterises a system in 
which multiple goods are produced. These products  can be classified in two categories: 
the goods necessary to satisfy what Keynes describes as the absolute needs, and the goods 
that are required to meet the relative needs.
25 In this economic system any carpenter or 
corn producer who would not be willing to accumulate wealth in the form of tables or corn, 
will instead be  willing to accumulate wealth in the form of money.    
After having defined the concept of wealth and considerin g  the elements  of the 
relation between bank money and uncertainty described in the previous section, it is 
possible to explain the presence of markets in which financial assets such as  long term 
bonds and stock are traded. The presence of these markets allows wealth owners to become 
speculators; once the savers-wealth owners decide how to use their disposable income by 
choosing between consumption and saving, they will have to define the  composition of 
their wealth by choosing money or alternative financial instruments.
26   
                                                 
25 “Now it is true that the needs of human beings may seem to be insatiable. But they fall into two classes –
those needs which are absolute in the sense that we feel them whatever the situation of our fellow human 
beings may be, and those which are relative in the sense that we feel them only if their satisfaction lifts us  
above, makes us feel superior to, our fellows. Needs of the second class, those which satisfy the desire for 
superiority, may indeed  be insatiable; for the higher the general level, the higher still are they. But this is not 
so true of the absolute need –a point may soon be reached, much sooner perhaps than we are all of us aware 
of, when these needs are satisfied in the sense that we prefer to devote our further energies to non-economic 
purposes.” (Keynes 1931,  CW vol. IX, p. 326) 
26 “The psychological time-preferences of an individual require two distinct sets of decisions… The first… 
determines for each individual how much of his income he will consume and how much he will reserve in 
some form of command over future consumption. But this decision having been made, there is a further 
decision which awaits him, namely in what form he will hold the command over future consumption which 
he have reserved… Does he want to hold it in the form of immediate, liquid command (i.e. money or its 
equivalent)? Or is he prepared to part with immediate command for a specified or indefinite period, leaving it 
to future market conditions to determine in what terms he can, if necessary, convert deferred command over 
specific goods into immediate command over goods in general?” (Keynes 1936, p.166)   22 
Keynes considers at least two alternative assets to money: long term bonds and shares. 
The  presence  of  long  term  bonds  can  be  associated  with  the  realisation  of  long  term 
investments such as, for example, railways, and/or the presence of a public sector that 
produces services that represent a significant amount of GDP.  Keynes uses the presence of 
long term bonds to explain an important aspect of the phenomenon of speculation, i.e. 
speculative demand for money; wealth owners become speculators in that they choose the 
composition  of  their  wealth  depending  on  their  forecasts,  formulated  in  conditions  of 
uncertainty, about prospective gains to be made from bonds  which depends on the future 
value of the rate of interest. 
The second type of asset that can be accumulated by savers as an alternative to money 
is shares. Keynes (1936, chapter 12) notes that the spread of shares characterises a phase in 
the development of the modern economy where the ownership of the firm is divided up 
among many owners who do not directly manage the firm; this evolution can be  explained 
by thinking of the realisation of innovations that require  large investments as in the case of 
railways. In this phase markets  in which shares and long term bonds are continuously 
traded develop, and the figure of the speculator emerges alongside that of the entrepreneur. 
Keynes distinguishes between speculation and enterprise by proposing to use: “… the term 
speculation  for  the  activity  of  forecasting  the  psychology  of  the  market,  and  the  term 
enterprise for the activity of forecasting the prospective yield of assets over their whole 
life…”  (Keynes  1936,  158).  The  element  that  the  activity  of  the  speculator  and  the 
entrepreneur share is the fact that they both rely on expectations even if these expectations 
happen to be different. The entrepreneur takes his decisions on the basis of expectations 
about the future profits of investments ‘over their whole life’ while the speculator must 
predict ‘the psychology of the market’. 
Keynes  distinguishes  two  categories  of  speculators;  the  first  is  made  up  of  
professional speculators who take  their decisions by gathering information on the financial 
situation of the various firms, making evaluations about their future value. These decisions 
are taken on the basis of the so-called fundamentals. The second category is made up of  
‘ignorant individuals’ that is, those who purchase and sell firms’ stock without having 
professional knowledge of the firm or the economic system (Keynes 1936, 154). Keynes 
further notes that in the financial markets, although it may not seem logical, the effects of 
the choices of the professional speculators do not necessarily prevail over those of the 
second  group of speculators (Keynes 1936,  154). And  this influences the behaviour of 
the  professional speculators for whom it is more profitable to try to predict how the market   23 
will evaluate bonds and stock rather than elaborate forecasts based on their professional 
competencies (Keynes 1936, 155).
27  
Keynes wonders  how speculation ca n influence  investment decisions such as the 
construction of a railway, an ocean liner, a new drug, on which society’s welfare depends. 
He notes that the presence of very liquid  financial markets  and an intense speculative 
activity can impede the realisation of these investments since the speculation may offer  
easier opportunities  for  gains.
28   Keynes believes that speculation can compromise the 
entrepreneurial spirit: 
 
“Speculators    may  do  no  harm  as  bubbles  on  a  steady  stream  of  enterprise. But  the 
position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation. When 
the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job 
is  likely  to  be  ill-done.  The  measure  of  success  attained  by  Wall  Street,  regarded  as  an 
institution  of  which the  proper  social  purpose  is  to  direct  new  investment  into  the    most 
profitable  channels in terms  of  future  yield, cannot  be  claimed  as  one  of the  outstanding 
triumphs of laissez-faire capitalism -which is not surprising, if I am right in thinking that the 
best brains of Wall Street have been directed towards a different object.” (Keynes 1936, p. 
159)
29  
   
                                                 
27 Keynes’s arguments are the same ones that Rajan uses to explain why even the bank managers who were 
aware of the fact that housing prices were over valued continued  to herd with other investment managers: 
“Would a few enterprising managers not want to buck the trend and thus return prices to fundamentals? 
Unfortunately, few would want to go up against the enormous mass of managers pursuing the trend. The 
reason is that their horizon is limited. If the mispricing in stocks does not correct itself in a relatively short 
while, the investment manager will see an erosion of his customers as he underperforms. It takes a very brave 
investment manager with infinitely patient investors to fight the trend, even if the trend is a deviation from 
fundamental value.” (Raian 2006, p. 517)  
28 “Investment based on genuine long-term expectation is so difficult to-day as to be scarcely practicable. He 
who attempts it must surely lead much more laborious days and run greater risks than he who tries to guess 
better  than  the  crowd  how  the  crowd  will  behave;  and,  given  equal  intelligence,  he  may  make  more 
disastrous mistakes. … It needs more intelligence to defeat the forces of time and our ignorance of the future 
than to beat the gun. Moreover, life is not long enough; -human nature desire quick results, there is a peculiar 
zest in making money quickly, and remoter gains are discounted by the average man at a very high rate.” 
(Keynes 1936, p. 157) Recently many economists have underlined this concept; see for example: Tobin 1984, 
Stiglitz 2010. 
29 The prevalence of speculation over enterprise would have high social costs : “The social object of skilled 
investment should be to defeat the dark forces of time and ignorance which envelop our future. The actual, 
private object of the most skilled investment to-day is ‘to beat the gun’, as the Americans so well express it, 
to outwit the crowd, and to pass the bad, or depreciating, half-crown to the other fellow.”   (Keynes 1936, p. 
155)   24 
These considerations allow us to underline the weakness of the mainstream theory that 
assumes the presence  of asset markets and speculative bubbles in a world in which one 
good is produced, and in which the role of the financial system is to intermediate funds 
from savers to entrepreneurs. Finally, we can highlight that the causal sequence between 
money and uncertainty  and the phenomenon of speculation that characterises the monetary 
economy described by Keynes allows us, unlike with the mainstream theory, to give a 
theoretical foundation to the relation between finance and risk that characterises Rajan’s 
analysis: 
 
“… we have to recognize that the only  truly safe financial system is a system that does not 
take risks, that does not finance innovation or growth, that does not help draw people out of 
poverty, and that gives consumers little choice. It is a system   that reinforces the incremental 
and thus the status quo. In the long run, though, especially given the enormous challenges the 
world faces –climate change, and aging population, and poverty, to name just a few –settling 
for the status quo may be the greatest risk of all, for it will make us unable to adapt to meet the 
coming challenges.” (Rajan 2010, p. 19) 
 
 
3.3The explanation of the crisis  
The lessons of Keynes and Schumpeter permits us to state that finance creates  uncertainty,  
to underline the link between saving and wealth accumulation and to define the concepts of 
wealth and speculation.  These features which characterise Keynes’s monetary economy 
and Schumpeter’s capitalist economy have two important consequences. First, they lead us 
to  recognise  that  there  is  no  ideal  world  without  imperfections  in  which  the  financial 
system is made only of savers who directly finance firms, and towards which concrete 
economic systems converge thanks to the action of financial intermediaries such as banks, 
whose  function  is  to  annul  the  effects  of  the  imperfections  that  characterise  the  real 
economy.   
Second, these features are crucial in illustrating the concept of tail risk presented by 
Rajan and to highlight the fragility of an economy characterised  by the presence  of a 
developed financial system, that is to emphasise the fact that the monetary economy is 
prone to crises. Minsky (1975, 1980,1982) who had been a student of Schumpeter, and on 
several  occasions  had  recommended  combining  the  approaches  of  Keynes  and 
Schumpeter
30 is the contemporary  economist who described the financial nature of the 
                                                 
30  As  well  as  Minsky  (1986,  1993)  other  authors  have  emphasised  the  desirability  of  integrating  the 
Keynesian  theory  of  income  determination  with  Schumpeter’s  theory  of  economic  development;  see  for 
example: Morishima (1992); Goodwin (1993); Vercelli (1997); Bertocco (2007).    25 
instability of a monetary  economy. It is easy to understand the reasons for this instability if 
we bear in mind that the money is created by means of a credit contract that provides that 
the debtor must repay the amount received at  a set future date.  It is a different  credit 
contract from the one that characterises Smith’s corn economy; in that case, the farmers 
who produced more grain than they required for their own consumption needs and their 
investment capacity, loan the corn to other farmers who are willing to invest it to produce 
more corn in the future. The  higher production of corn obtained through the investment 
will allow the debtor to reimburse the loan obtained; a  corn  economy  is  not  a fragile 
economy  even  in  the  presence  of  a  high  level  of  dissociation  between  saving  and 
investment. 
Instead, in the case of a monetary economy the credit contract permits the creation of 
money used to finance investments with which innovations are realised; the financing of 
innovations makes the system fragile because it occurs in conditions of uncertainty. The 
entrepreneur who took out a loan to build a railway will be able to repay the loan only if he 
is able to sell a sufficient quantity of train tickets. Unlike what happens in the case of corn, 
in which the proceeds are determined by the productivity of the corn used as a means of 
production, there is no objective criteria for predicting the monetary proceeds that will be 
produced  by the railway.  
The  fragility  of  a  monetary  economy  does  not  only  derive  from  the  financing  of 
innovations but also from speculation. Indeed, the credit contract through which money is 
created  can  serve  to  finance  the  speculative  demand  for  assets;  also  this  operation  is 
performed in conditions of uncertainty and therefore the stability of the system increases. 
The subprime crisis can be seen as  an important example which confirm Keynes’s thesis 
that a  monetary economy  is  very fragile:  “...when enterprise becomes the bubble on a 
whirlpool of speculation...” (Keynes 1936, p. 159) 
 We can conclude that the meaning of the elements used by Rajan to assert that risk is 
not  independent  of  finance  can  be    explained  by  taking  into  account  the  features  that 
characterise  a  monetary  economy:  i)    the  process  of  money  creation  managed  by  the 
banking system that makes it possible to explain the expansion in the supply of mortgages; 
ii) the creation of uncertainty on the part of the financial system by means of the expansion 
of  the  supply  and  demand  of  subprime  mortgages  determined  by  the  widespread 
expectations  of  a  continuous  increase  in  housing  prices;  iii)  the  importance  of  the 
speculation phenomenon. 




Rajan has earned a well-deserved reputation amongst economists for having been one of 
the few to have hypothesised, in a deservedly famous paper presented at the Jackson Hole 
conference, that a disastrous financial crisis could occur.  
In this paper it has been show that the analysis of the origin of the crisis developed  by 
Rajan is based on two points that are not coherent with the mainstream theory of finance: i) 
the thesis that finance can  create risk; ii) the concept of the asset  price bubble necessary in 
order to  define the tail risk taken on by the banks. In the last part of this paper a theory of 
finance has been presented, based on the theories of Keynes and Schumpeter, which is  
capable  of  giving  a  theoretical  justification  to  these  two  elements.  Starting  with  the 
Keynesian concepts of monetary theory of production and monetary economy, it has been 
shown that the importance of the dimension of uncertainty derives from the existence of a 
money such as bank money. In a monetary economy, finance, which can be identified with 
the process of money creation through a credit contract, not only creates uncertainty but it 
determines the conditions for the  concepts of wealth and speculation to come to the fore. 
This relation between money,  uncertainty  and speculation  was illustrated by highlighting 
the complementary nature of  the theories of Keynes and Schumpeter. Finally, referring to 
Minsky’s theory, it is concluded that the causal sequence that links money to uncertainty 
and speculation allows us to explain the financial nature of the instability that characterises 
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